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Family Over Rules? 
An ethical analysis of allowing families to overrule donation intentions 
 
David Shaw, Denie Georgieva, Bernadette Haase, Dale Gardiner, Penney 
Lewis, Nichon Jansen, Tineke Wind, Undine Samuel, Maryon McDonald and 
Rutger Ploeg on behalf of the ELPAT Working Group on Deceased Donation 	
Abstract 
Millions of people want to donate their organs after they die for transplantation, 
and many of them have registered their wish to do so or told their family and 
friends about their decision. For most of them, however, this wish is unlikely to 
be fulfilled, as only a small number of deaths (1% in the United Kingdom) 
occur in circumstances where the opportunity to donate organs is possible. 
Even for those who do die in the ‘right’ way and have recorded their wishes or 
live in a jurisdiction with a ‘presumed consent’ system, donation often does 
not go ahead because of another issue: their families refuse to allow donation 
to proceed. In some jurisdictions the rate of “family overrule” is over 10%. 
 
In this paper we provide a systematic ethical analysis of the family overrule of 
donation of solid organs by deceased patients, and examine arguments both 
in favour of and against allowing relatives to ‘veto’ the potential donor’s 
intentions. First, we provide a brief review of the different consent systems in 
various European countries, and the ramifications for family overrule. Next, 
we describe and discuss the arguments in favour of permitting donation 
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intentions to be overruled, and then the arguments against doing so. The ‘pro’ 
arguments are: overrule minimises family distress and staff stress; families 
need to cooperate for donation to take place; families might have evidence 
regarding refusal; and failure to permit overrules could weaken trust in the 
donation system. The ‘con’ arguments are: overrule violates the patient’s 
wishes; the family is too distressed and will regret the decision; overruling 
harms other patients; and regulations prohibit overrule. We conclude with a 
general discussion and recommendations for dealing with families who wish 





Across Europe tens of thousands of patients are on waiting lists for organ 
transplantation; an average of 11 people in need of an organ died every day 
in 2014, and at the end of that year 60,664 people were on the waiting list.1 In 
the United Kingdom alone, three patients die every day waiting for an organ. 2  
Many people have registered as organ donors in order to help potential 
recipients. But becoming an organ donor is not simply a matter of registering 
one’s intention to donate, and then eventually dying in a way that enables 
donation; it also requires that one’s family does not overrule donation. Most 
families are very distressed to learn of their relative’s death and cannot handle 
the idea of donation, expressing their opposition in a way that healthcare staff 
can find difficult to resist – even if regulations and legislation say that the 




Consent and overrule: international context 
 
Almost all countries allow some sort of overrule, regardless of the particular 
consent system in place in a given nation. The following section explores a 
number of European examples, and a summary is provided in Table 1. 
 
In the UK, consent in advance to organ donation is most frequently given by 
joining the organ Donor Register (DR), an opt-in system that allows 
specification of which organs are to be donated. Although Human Tissue 
Authority guidelines state that registered donor wishes should be respected,3 
health professionals tend to allow families to overrule donation.  In the last 
year, 120 families (12% of approaches) overruled donation from a patient who 
was a registered donor, with the most common reason being that the time for 
the donation process was too long.1,4 Family overrule is three times more 
likely in donation after circulatory death, three times more likely in minority 
ethnic populations and three times more likely if there was no specialist nurse 
for organ donation involvement in the family approach.3 Under new donation 
legislation in Wales, an adult Welsh resident who dies in Wales will be 
deemed to have consented to donation, unless the patient has registered a 
decision to consent to donation, registered a refusal to donate, or appointed a 
representative to make this decision.5   
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In Switzerland, there is no national register, but residents can easily create an 
organ donor card that indicates which one of three options has been chosen. 
The first is donation, with details regarding which organs can be taken. The 
second is to register objection to any donation, effectively making the organ 
donor card an organ refusal card. The third is to nominate a representative 
who should be contacted and will make a decision in the event of a choice 
having to be made. Families frequently refuse and overrule donation in 
Switzerland; over 40% of donations are stopped by the family, although there 
is no data on how many of these are overrules.6  
 
The Netherlands implemented the Organ and Tissue Donation Act in 1998, 
which is based on an opt-in system, supported by a national DR. Health care 
professionals consult the DR in case of a medically suitable donor before the 
relatives are approached. In the DR, Dutch residents can state their wish with 
regard to donation. The DR offers four options for organ and tissue donation: 
consent (with or without restrictions to specific organs or tissues); refusal; 
leave the decision to a specific person; or leave the decision to relatives in 
general. In 2014 families refused organ donation in 6% (11/175) of cases 
when consent was registered in the DR.7 According to the Dutch law an entry 
on the donor register does not have the same legal status as a will. For 
example, a will can only be modified or revoked by the testator, in contrast to 
the DR, where this rule does not apply.8 Therefore, families can - if they 
provide very serious reasons why the donation procedure cannot take place -  
overrule the consent given in the DR by the potential donor if they do not 
agree with the registered decision. This is based on the Explanatory 
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Memorandum to the Organ and Tissue Donation Act.9 The term 'very serious 
reason' is not defined in any official documents. There is an unwritten 
professional standard for situations like these.  
 
On June 25 1997, the German Parliament approved a bill regulating organ 
transplants, the so called Transplantationsgesetz, which came into effect in 
December 1997 and is based on an opt-in system. This transplant act was 
updated in 2012. Post-mortem organ removal is allowed in different situations, 
one being when the potential donor has expressed consent. One can do this 
by stating wishes in a dedicated advance directive, but an informal written 
statement is also binding if signed by the donor. Another possibility is an 
organ donor card on which a person can state consent or objection, or leave 
the decision to a particular person. There is no national registry.10 In cases 
where no document exists, families are asked whether they know about any 
statement of the deceased. The families must have had contact with the 
potential donor in the last two years before his/her death, to be able to know 
about a statement or his/her attitude concerning organ donation.11 . If relatives 
do not know about the will of the deceased, they are allowed to take a 
decision on basis on the relative’s own moral concepts, taking into account 
the presumed will. If they were not in contact or there are no direct relatives, a 
close friend can do this instead. If there are documented intentions or an 
organ donor card with the expressed will to donate organs (or tissues), the 
relatives (or friends) cannot normally overrule the decision of the deceased. 
His or her decision is legally binding; the organ donor card is equal to the last 
will.12 But there may be a situation where the organ donation is not carried out, 
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because the relatives refused. This can be the case when an organ donation 
is perceived as risking severe psychological trauma to the relatives.13 (The 
law does not state that relatives cannot overrule donation, but this is implied 
by the status of the recorded donation intentions as a last will.) 
 
Austria has a strict presumed consent system, with a national registry to 
record objections. Besides objections documented in this registry, any other 
form of declaration of a deceased person's will regarding post-mortem organ 
donation (for example an informal document found among the identity papers 
of the deceased or an oral declaration made in presence of the family) is 
respected. Under Austrian law family members of the deceased are not 
entitled to object to organ donation.14  However, in practice the family 
members can overrule the wishes of the presumed donor.  
 
Spain was one of the first countries to implement organ donation legislation. 
The 1979 Act Nr.30/1979 provides for an opt-out system: removal of organs is 
permitted when the deceased has not made an objection. Objection to organ 
donation can be expressed in any way, without formal procedures. To 
establish if there is an objection, several steps can be taken, such as 
inspection of the medical file, search of personal belongings and/or asking the 
family. According to some commentators, presumed consent equates simply 
with the presumed consent of the potential donor – the actual decision to 
donate is up to the potential donor's family.15 The family can base its decision 
on many factors, for example on the expressed wish of the deceased.  
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Belgium operates a similar system to that of Austria; organs will be removed 
unless an objection is recorded in the national registry.16  Families can 
overrule donation if there was no recorded wish to donate, but there is no 
need to inform them about donation.17 
 
Arguments in favour of the family overrule 
 
 In this section we set out and analyse six arguments in favour of the family 
overrule. In summary, those who support letting families overrule a recorded 
wish to donate argue that doing so can reduce their distress and minimise 
stress for healthcare staff; in addition, donation cannot proceed without 
practical information being provided by families. Proponents of overrule also 
argue that families might have new information about a patient’s refusal to 
donate, that going against the wishes of families could weaken trust in the 
donation system, and that too much emphasis can be placed on respecting 
the wishes of the individual.  
 
Minimising family distress 
The main argument in favour of allowing families to overrule established 
donation intentions is to minimise their distress. Almost all families in this 
situation have been very recently (or are just about to be) bereaved, and can 
be extremely upset even before donation is mentioned. To proceed with 
donation in the face of a strong objection from a family member might make a 
difficult situation even more distressing for them (even if any such objections 
may sometimes stem more from the fact that they are already upset than from 
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a deeply held belief). This argument is particularly relevant for families (and 
countries) that place particular importance on respecting the body after death. 
 
Minimising staff stress 
A second, related argument is that proceeding with donation and risking 
further upsetting families also places great strain on healthcare staff, who 
must witness this distress and may feel guilty about exacerbating it – or for 
being responsible for it. It is understandable that doctors, nurses and 
transplant coordinators find it difficult to challenge family reluctance or refusal 
to donate organs, as doing so can cause psychological stress. 
 
Practical cooperation 
A third argument is that donation requires the practical cooperation of the 
family. Families are an essential source of information regarding any recent 
illnesses or medications that might affect the likelihood of successful 
transplant; if an attempt to overrule donation is ignored, families are likely to 
refuse to cooperate with these practical checks. 
 
New information regarding refusal 
A fourth, related argument is that the family may have new information about 
their relative’s willingness to donate. Any recorded wish to donate is normally 
disclosed to the family in case the potential donor had changed his or her 
mind since registering an intention to donate – for example, a patient could 
have signed up to be a donor decades before, and subsequently changed her 
mind but never removed his or her name from the donor register. In addition, 
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the family may be able to offer valuable input regarding assessment of 
whether donation and associated interventions are what the patient would 
have wanted in the circumstances that are occurring.15 (It should also be 
noted that families might question whether ticking a box on a driving licence 
application is sufficient for informed consent to donation.18) 
  
Undermining trust in system 
A fifth argument is that going against families’ wishes could undermine trust in 
the donation system. If there were media coverage of cases where families’ 
attempts to overrule were unsuccessful, it could lead to many registered 
donors removing their names from the register, or registering an objection to 
donation, and ultimately to a lower number of donations and transplantations 
than would have been possible had the families in question been allowed to 
overrule. However, the converse is also true; allowing families to claim that 
the patient had changed his or her mind could also weaken trust in the organ 
donor system, if potential donors lose confidence that their wishes will be 
respected. 
 
De-emphasising the individual 
Finally, a related cluster of arguments concerns the idealisation of the 
individual. It can be argued that placing so much emphasis on the individual 
wishes of the deceased or dying patient idealises the independence of the 
person and neglects the relational nature of social persons everywhere.19  An 
ethical argument flowing from this point might be that the decision is not in 
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practice that of an individual alone to make and that we should pay closer 
attention to the effects on others of our actions and wishes.  
 
Arguments against the family overrule 
 
There are also at least five arguments against allowing families to overrule 
donation. In summary, these are as follows: the overrule disrespects the 
wishes of the deceased patient; allowing families to overrule when they are 
upset about the death of a relative is unfair, and they can soon come to regret 
overruling donation; each overrule means that several organs are not 
transplanted which could have been, leading to prolonged suffering and 
sometimes deaths of potential recipients; and the legislation and regulations 
in many countries is that donation intentions should be honoured.   
 
Violating the wishes of the deceased 
The first argument is that permitting a family overrule violates the wishes of 
the deceased; if someone was a registered donor, this is clear evidence of an 
intention to donate, and that his or her intentions should be respected. 
Ignoring the “dying wish” of a patient can be seen as dishonouring the 
deceased. It should be noted, however, that while registration is evidence of 
consent to donation, it cannot automatically carry the same weight as consent 
elsewhere in medicine where greater efforts to inform the patient are made. It 
should also be noted that the distinction between opt-in and presumed 
consent systems can affect the weighing of evidence in this context. An active 
registration of an intention to donate will normally be regarded as stronger 
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evidence of a wish to donate than the absence of a refusal to donate in a 
country that operates a presumed consent system. In the latter case, a family 
could claim that their relative was unaware that failure to declare an objection 
constitutes consent to donation. 
 
Placing a burden on families 
Another argument against permitting families to overrule is that it is unfair to 
expect families to make this decision when they are already so distressed 
about the loss of a loved one. Making a decision about whether to object to 
donation places a considerable burden on families, who might instinctively 
refuse donation because they are so upset. This could lead to the decision 
being an impulsive one that fails to reflect their (or the deceased patient’s) 
settled values rather than the emotions that are dominant at this very stressful 
time.17 It is understandable that staff don’t want to upset families further, but it 
is not wise to give families the opportunity to go against the wishes of their 
deceased relatives when they are already distressed and are likely to make a 
potentially rash, highly emotional decision. Furthermore, families in this 
situation are subject to many biasing factors that can be addressed (lack of 
knowledge about benefits of donation; belief that patient will suffer if donation 
goes ahead; misunderstanding of brain death, etc20). Therefore, in many 
cases it would be responsible to consider the family’s best interests in the 
medium to long term rather than simply granting an attempted overrule. 
 
Coming to regret the overrule 
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The third argument against permitting overrule is very closely related to the 
previous one: families can come to regret a decision to overrule donation. 
This is unsurprising, given that such decisions are often made in very 
challenging circumstances. In addition, many families who permit donation 
feel that helping others via transplantation is a “silver lining” to the death of a 
relative; families who override deny themselves this small solace, and some 
relatives may also regret failing to respect the wishes of their dead relatives 
and/or not helping potential recipients. Evidence from a Brazilian study 
suggests that the regret often experienced by families who override donation 
may lead to a change of heart: even in cases where there was no registered 
intention to donate, over 50% of families who refused to allow donation would 
subsequently permit it in similar circumstances.21  
 
Contribution to avoidable harm 
In addition to the three main arguments concerning the potential donor’s 
wishes and the role of the family, there is another key reason to prevent 
overrule of donation intentions: each overrule contributes to avoidable harm. 
Each overridden donation means that several organs are lost from the pool of 
organs; this in turn means that potential recipients must wait longer for organs, 
and this wait will often result in avoidable deaths. Even if patients do not die, 
the wait can be detrimental to their overall health and well-being. In other 
cases patients will die as a direct result of donation intentions being 
overridden. Although it is understandable that healthcare staff want to avoid 
further distressing families, it is also important to consider the consequences 
Page	16	of	26		
of allowing overrule, though many doctors will be reluctant to mention these 
consequences to families.22  
 
Regulation and legislation 
A more technical argument against the overrule is that the laws and 
guidelines governing donation in many jurisdictions make it clear that the 
patient’s wishes should be respected. In England and Wales, the Human 
Tissue Authority Code of Practice on Donation13 makes clear that where an 
adult made a decision to, or not to, consent to organ donation taking place 
after their death, then that consent is sufficient for the activity to be lawful:  
 
Once it is known that the deceased person consented to donation, the matter 
should be discussed sensitively with those close to the deceased. They should be 
encouraged to recognise the wishes of the deceased and it should be made clear, 
if necessary, that they do not have the legal right to veto or overrule their wishes. 
There may nevertheless be cases in which donation is considered inappropriate 
and each case should be assessed individually [102].23 
 
The new version of this Code, to be published in 2017, is more strongly 
worded, specifically stating that “A relative’s objection does not nullify 




There are a number of key arguments in favour of allowing an overrule, and a 
number of key arguments against doing so. The opinion of the ELPAT 
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Deceased Donation Working Group is that enabling families to overrule 
disrespects the wishes of the deceased, can be regretted by families, and 
contributes to avoidable death and suffering. The potential harms of permitting 
an overrule are greater and more serious than the potential harms of not 
permitting one. Therefore, we conclude that a registered intention to donate 
should generally be respected, regardless of objection from the family, unless 
their objection is that the deceased had changed his or her mind since 
registering as a donor (or was unaware that a presumed consent system was 
in operation). Any such claim would not really be an overrule, but new 
evidence of a refusal to donate. In some limited circumstances, however, it 
could be argued that the interventions necessary to make donation possible, 
or the long wait that families must endure, constitute potential additional 
reasons for respecting a family’s wish to overrule. Whether it is ethical to 
permit an overrule in such cases will depend on the balance between the 
strength of evidence regarding the donor’s consent to donation and the level 
of intervention that would be required to make that donation happen. 
 
We must also consider the real-world implications of attempting to stop all 
overrules, and whether the practical consequences of following such a rule in 
practice could be counterproductive. On a basic level, a family opposed to 
donation might simply claim that the deceased’s wishes had changed. The 
family might do so if they wanted to prevent donation but knew that admitting 
he or she still wanted to donate would make an overrule impossible. Ignoring 
the wishes of families could also make intensive care unit (ICU) staff less 
likely to be willing to explore donation with relatives in the future, and could 
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weaken trust in the organ donation system by alienating potential donors. For 
example, someone who is currently on the organ donor register might 
withdraw consent to donation if it were made clear that families will have no 
input to the process.  Families with strong objections whose wishes are 
ignored might contact the media, resulting in damaging press coverage of a 
vital part of any national healthcare system and a wider decrease in the 
number of people registered. (Equally, of course, allowing families an “easy 
overrule” could also result in donors losing trust in the system.) In addition, 
ignoring families who claim that their loved one had changed their mind about 
donation could actually result in the removal of organs from someone who 
had really changed her mind. If these consequences flowed from changing to 
a strict no-overrule system, the change would be unethical. Equally, however, 
simply allowing families to continue to veto unimpeded would be unethical.  
 
So what is the best way forward? We suggest that the solution is to continue 
to permit overrules in very particular circumstances, whilst working towards 
modifying the circumstances that may lead to an overrule being considered in 
the first place. There are several strategies that can be used to discourage 
families from overruling.  
 
One of the simplest strategies is to encourage everyone who signs up to an 
organ donor register to talk to his or her family and friends about their decision 
and stress how important donation is to them. Of course, some people might 
well be happy for their family to overrule if distressed and this could be 
communicated too. This strategy has the advantage of involving relatives and 
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friends well before the event that makes donation possible, meaning that they 
are not presented with the information only after (for example) a car accident. 
However, one disadvantage of this strategy is that people may forget to talk 
about this, or will question whether a person’s intention to donate persisted 
over several years or decades after the conversation about donation. This 
problem about persistence of wishes also applies to “old” donor registrations. 
One potential tool that would avoid this problem is the personalised organ 
donation directive, a type of advance directive that asks donors to reaffirm 
their intentions every year and also allows them to send video messages to 
relatives before or after death.25 26 Or, more simply, organ donor registers can 
be created with the ability for individuals to record a written personal message 
(see below). 
 
In some cases, families will remain unaware of or unconvinced by their 
relative’s wish to donate. In such circumstances another potential strategy is 
to ask them (without coercion or manipulation) to respect the wishes of the 
deceased.17 This option has the advantage of directly addressing stated 
reasons for the overrule, but also the disadvantage of further upsetting 
families when they are already distressed by the death. In the United States, 
attempts to prevent families overruling donation have gone as far as the 
courts, with court cases resulting in judgments against the families.27 US 
federal law states that “a person other than the donor is barred from making, 
amending, or revoking an anatomical gift of a donor’s body or part if the donor 
made an anatomical gift of the donor’s body or part."28 We would not 
recommend pursuing such a hard-line approach, for the practical reasons 
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mentioned above. A related strategy is to ensure that healthcare staff 
themselves are always aware of the importance of facilitating donation, which 
must also include at least investigating any attempt at overrule. Good 
interaction between professionals and family members is essential to the 
donation process. 
 
A final option to consider is ensuring that the system for registering intent to 
donate is as flexible as possible, so that potential donor’s wishes can be 
accurately reflected. More robust and personalisable systems of consent 
could help to inform families and healthcare professionals about when an 
overrule might be permissible (e.g. where donation involves highly technical 
measures such as in situ extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) or 
will take several days). As stated above, in summer 2015 the UK made 
changes to the register to allow people to register an objection to donation. 
However, an opportunity was missed to enable people to indicate consent to 
donation but also state that it would be or would not be acceptable for a 
relative to overrule. Furthermore, the new register might have allowed donors 
to record a short message that could be shown to family members if donation 
becomes an option - similar to, but more basic than, the personalised directive 
mentioned above. Implementation of each of these measures would make it 
more likely that registered donation intentions accurately reflect the genuine 
wishes of donors (or refusers), and in turn increase the likelihood that these 
wishes will be respected by family members or friends. Our suggested 
strategies are summarised in Table 2; in essence, we recommend 
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encouraging donors to communicate, ensuring that professionals challenge 
overrules, and enhancing consent systems. 
 
One other point that should be clarified concerns an apparent asymmetry. The 
status quo is that families who have serious objections can overrule donation; 
this has been the focus of our discussion. But can families also overrule a 
registered objection to donation? At first glance this might seem to be an 
appealing argument, because overruling an objection could save or improve 
the lives of potential recipients. In contrast, overruling a wish to donate can 
deprive recipients of organs, leading to suffering and death. But there is a key 
legal and ethical difference between giving consent to permit organs to be 
taken if circumstances permit it, and refusing to donate organs under any 
circumstances. In the former case, consent legitimises the removal of organs, 
but does not mandate it.	In the latter case, refusal would normally not be 
contingent upon circumstances in the same way as consent. In other words, 
the “yes” to donation is permissive, while the “no” refusal to donate is more 
prescriptive. This key difference parallels the consent/refusal distinction 
elsewhere in medicine. If a patient consents to treatment, there is not any 
obligation to provide that treatment; but if a patient refuses a particular 
treatment or intervention, it would be battery to ignore that refusal. In the case 
of organ donation, the patient’s interest in her bodily integrity post-mortem 
may be weaker than it is during life, but the refusal to donate nonetheless 
seems to be more powerful than a consent to donation. There are also two 
other reasons why the seeming asymmetry might in fact be justified. Families 
are sometimes permitted to overrule a consent because they are distressed at 
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the idea of donation, but families are unlikely to be upset at the idea of not 
going ahead with donation if they know donation was not what the patient 
wanted. Similarly, it seems plausible that they are less likely to come to regret 
failure to overrule an objection than they are to regret failure to overrule a 
recorded consent to donation. Indeed, they might actually come to regret 
overruling an objection because they failed to respect a loved one’s dying 
wish to have his or her bodily integrity respected. For all these reasons, it 
might be appropriate to permit overrules of consent in some cases, but never 
to permit overruling of registered refusals unless convincing evidence can be 
provided that a recipient had really changed his mind and wanted to donate. 






Every country in Europe allows some type of family overrule in practice. There 
are strong ethical arguments in favour of preventing families from overruling a 
known intention to donate. These concern not only autonomy, but also the 
potential benefit to other patients of receiving organs, and the regret that can 
be felt by families who overrule donation. However, there are several reasons 
why overrules are sometimes acceptable. Current registration systems across 
Europe are fairly basic, meaning that donors cannot indicate nuance 
regarding their donation wishes beyond which specifying which organs they 
wish to donate; there are some circumstances in which families provide 
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evidence of a change in donation intentions; and there are some limited cases 
in which the donor would not have consented had he known the specifics of 
the particular organ donation scenario in question (such as the long waiting 
period before donation or use of ECMO, etc). Ultimately, adopting a hard-line 
no-overrule system could have detrimental consequences for donation 
systems and donation rates. Therefore, the best option appears to be asking 
families and friends to respect donation intentions, through adoption of more 
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